This unique collection of writings by physicians and other health care providers looks at various topics in the arts and humanities, showing a side of the medical profession rarely seen. In this reversal of the usual practice of humanists looking at medicine, the writers here discuss such areas as 'The Physician as Creative Reader,' 'Religion in the Life of the Physician,' 'The Surgeon as Sculptor,' 'The Physician in the Arms Race,' among others.

_The Bus Kids_ offers a compelling and uniquely detailed examination of the experiences of kindergarten students in California participating in a voluntary school desegregation program. Ira Lit focuses on the day-to-day school life of a group of minority children bussed from their poor-performing home school district to an affluent neighboring district with high-performing schools. Through these kindergarteners’ experiences, the book sensitively illuminates the processes of school transition, socialization, and adaptation, and addresses an array of important issues relating to American education. (...) Lit acutely observes these “bus kids” and the quality of their social, emotional, cultural, and academic experiences. He presents a moving picture of the complexity of challenges, often unrecognized by teachers and parents, each young student confronted every day. (shrink)

Significant efforts have been made to define ethical responsibilities for professionals engaged in nanotechnology innovation. Rosalyn Berne delineated three ethical dimensions of nanotechnological innovation: non-negotiable concerns, negotiable socio-cultural claims, and tacitly ingrained norms. Braden Allenby demarcated three levels of responsibility: the individual, professional societies (e.g. engineering codes), and the macro-ethical. This article will explore how these definitions of responsibility map onto practitioners’ understanding of their responsibilities and the responsibilities of others using the nanotechnology innovation community of the greater Phoenix area, (...) which includes academic researchers, investors, entrepreneurs, manufacturers, insurers, attorneys, buyers, and media. To do this we develop a three-by-three matrix that combines Berne’s three dimensions and Allenby’s three levels. We then categorize the ethical responsibilities expressed by forty-five practitioners in semi-structured interviews using these published dimensions and levels. Two questions guide the research: (i) what responsibilities do actors express as theirs and/or assign to other actors and; (ii) can those responsibilities be mapped to the presented ethical frameworks? We found that most of the responsibilities outlined by our respondents concentrate at the professional society + non-negotiable and professional + negotiable intersections. The study moves from a philosophical exploration of ethics to an empirical analysis, exploring strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in the existing nanotechnology innovation network. This opens the door for new practitioners to be introduced in an effort to address responsibilities that are not currently recognized. (shrink)

David Lewis famously dismisses genuine impossible worlds on the basis that a contradiction bound within the scope of his modifier ‘at w’ amounts to a contradiction tout court—an unacceptable consequence. Motivated by the rising demand for impossible worlds in philosophical theorising, this paper examines whether anything coherent can be said about an extension of Lewis’ theory of genuine, concrete possible worlds into genuine, concrete impossible worlds. Lewis’ reasoning reveals two ways to carve out conceptual space for the genuinely impossible. The (...) first is to abandon Lewis’ classical translation schema for negation, on the basis that it begs the question against incomplete and inconsistent worlds. I argue that, whilst this option incurs some loss in the semantics, it preserves the core spirit of Lewis’ metaphysics. The alternative is to bite the bullet, abandon classical logic and embrace true contradictions. The key challenge with this strategy is that the resulting theory seems committed to a particularly strong kind of dialethism—one that even dialethists would be reluctant to accept. I motivate such a dialethic account of genuine impossibilia using Lewis’ own methodology and defend it against triviality objections. I close with a few comments on why impossible worlds should not be reduced to set theoretic constructs out of possible worlds. (shrink)

Biologists, historians, lawyers, art historians, and literary critics all voice arguments in the critical dialogue about what constitutes evidence in research and scholarship. They examine not only the constitution and "blurring" of disciplinary boundaries, but also the configuration of the fact-evidence distinctions made in different disciplines and historical moments the relative function of such concepts as "self-evidence," "experience," "test," "testimony," and "textuality" in varied academic discourses and the way "rules of evidence" are themselves products of historical developments. The essays and (...) rejoinders are by Terry Castle, Lorraine Daston, Carlo Ginzburg, Ian Hacking, Mark Kelman, R. C. Lewontin, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Mary Poovey, Donald Preziosi, Simon Schaffer, Joan W. Scott, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and Barbara Herrnstein Smith. The critical responses are by Lauren Berlant, James Chandler, Jean Comaroff, Arnold I. Davidson, Harry D. harootunian, Elizabeth Helsinger, Thomas C. Holt, Francoise Meltzer, Robert J. Richards, Lawrence Rothfield, Joel Snyder, Cass R. Sunstein, and William Wimsatt. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Secular Government, Religious People by Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. TuttleJoshua T. MauldinSecular Government, Religious People Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle grand rapids, mi: eerdmans, 2014. 279 pp. $25.00.In Secular Government, Religious People, Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle provide a structuralist account of the Establishment Clause and suggest that their conception of the secular character of government resonates with the dominant strand of (...) First Amendment jurisprudence. On their view, the religion clauses are not only about the religious rights of persons; the Establishment Clause is primarily about the character of government itself. That character is secular, meaning that the government is “constitutionally disabled” from settling “ecclesiastical questions.” These include not only obviously theological questions about the nature of God or true religion but also seemingly more mundane matters such as “Who is fit to be a minister?” or “Which faction of a fractured religious congregation is closer to the beliefs of the congregation’s charter members?”The problem with judicial attempts to engage such questions became increasingly evident in the development of legal doctrine throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and one of the primary values of this book is its clear account of this history. One example is the “iconic” Supreme Court decision in the 1971 case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, which included an important rule against “excessive entanglement” between the state and religious groups, based on the Establishment Clause. For Lupu and Tuttle, this ruling is paradigmatic of their structuralist argument for nonestablishment. If the Establishment Clause requires that government be secular, then the government may not claim divine authority or establish a covenant with God or engage in acts of worship. The government may, nevertheless, acknowledge the religious character of its people; the religious freedom of the people is protected by the secular character of government in that a sphere of society is reserved for religious practice and thereby protected from governmental intrusion. While religious persons might actually prefer that government “interfere” in the religious sphere for various reasons, and might even view the government’s failure to do so as an assault on religious freedom, it is precisely the noninterference of government in religious matters that protects religious freedom.The book involves both a descriptive analysis of the development of American law and a normative argument for a particular legal philosophy. Tuttle and Lupu argue that it is best when government is secular, and they suggest that this is a basic assumption of mainstream American law, both in its origins and later [End Page 213] trajectory. Some will question the sharp distinction drawn between “government” and “people.” In a democratic society, is there a clear line between the people and the government as representative of the people’s will? Furthermore, one wonders whether the kind of American “civil religion” that Robert Bellah famously analyzed in the 1960s, and against which Tuttle and Lupu inveigh, is simply here to stay. American presidents continue to invoke God in public speeches, and many citizens believe that the United States itself is in a covenant with God. Tuttle and Lupu worry that any appeal to such a covenant leads to the “totalitarian” identification of political and divine authority. But the covenant with God could just as easily lead to a critique of political authority as to a reinforcement of it. As Abraham Lincoln declared in a legendary piece of American political theology, “The Almighty has his own purposes.” For Tuttle and Lupu, this kind of civil religion is both unconstitutional and bad public policy. But one wonders whether we could ever really eradicate it, and even if we could, whether it would be wise to do so.Joshua T. MauldinCenter of Theological InquiryCopyright © 2016 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Spór o dopuszczalność aborcji podtrzymują sprzeczne twierdzenia na temat statusu istoty ludzkiej pojmowanej jako osoba i stanowiącej część wspólnoty ludzkiej, która przestrzega pewnych norm dotyczących ludzi. Centralną normą jest tu zakaz zabijania ludzi. Przedstawiciele stanowiska rygorystycznego twierdzą, że w przypadku niepewności, każdy egzemplarz gatunku ludzkiego należy traktować jako bezwarunkowo upoważniony do nieprzerwanego istnienia biologicznego ; organizm ludzki staje się osobą i członkiem wspólnoty moralnej od chwili zapłodnienia oocytu przez plemnik; każdy przypadek rozmyślnego zniszczenia ludzkiego embrionu należy uznać za niewybaczalne zabójstwo. (...) Przedstawiciele stanowiska liberalnego utrzymują, że nie należy wprowadzać ustaw, których nie wspiera konsensus ; organizm ludzki staje się członkiem wspólnoty moralnej w chwili narodzin; przypadki zakończenia życia nie–osób należy traktować podobnie do zabijania nie–osób, tj. biorąc pod uwagę hierarchię podmiotów i motywy osoby działającej. Niestety, spór o dopuszczalność aborcji zwykle nie bierze pod uwagę stanowiska milczącej większości, która wydaje się uważać, że organizm ludzki staje się członkiem wspólnoty moralnej wtedy, gdy jego centralny układ nerwowy podejmuje swoje funkcje, tj. ok. dwunastego tygodnia ciąży; organizmowi ludzkiemu, który jeszcze nie ma statusu osoby, należy przypisać specjalny status, który przewyższa status zwierzęcia, lecz nie jest tożsamy ze statusem osoby. Wzięcie tych okoliczności pod uwagę musi skutkować akceptacją dla zakończenia życia płodów ludzkich wtedy, gdy występują poważne po temu przesłanki. (shrink)

Although Dirār b. ʿAmr is the most important mutakallim of the second century, he is unfortunately one of the unjustified names in the history of kalām. Dirâr is a mutakallim whose name is rarely mentioned in theological publications published in both Turkish and foreign languages until recently, and his importance and position are still not noticed. As a matter of fact, Josef van Ess and W. Montgomery Watt, who are famous orientalists, discovered this tragic fact and tried to make up (...) for this deficiency to some extent with their studies. Dirâr wrote a refutation of Aristotle's theory of substance and accident, opened a new way with his understanding of existence based on accidents and led Ash'ari with the theory of kasb and Ebu'l-Huzayl al-‘Allaf with his kalām accumulation. Undoubtedly, one of the things that makes Dirār important is that he had views that went beyond his time and caused him to contradict his contemporaries as early as the second century in terms of the history of Islamic thought. Considering the list of works that have not survived, except for one, in such a period when the mainstream sects were not yet formed and they were on the eve of their formation, Dirār was generally in a critical dialogue with the Islamic and non-Islamic movements he encountered and knew. For this reason, it is almost impossible to place him in any religious sect mentioned in his period. Because he often preferred to follow his own ideas rather than the opinions of others on many issues. Naturally, this makes it difficult to place Dirār in a certain school and frees him from all kinds of bonds. Yes, in the sources we come across many allegations, accusations and slanders that Dirār is a Cahmi/Jabri, he is a Mu‘tazili, he is an innovator with malignant ideas, he is an infidel to put a bounty on his head. Understanding the reasons for these depends on getting to know Dirār, understanding his ideas, and determining his position. If we say in the context of our study, the position of Dirār is actually a state of non-position, and we think that the concept that best expresses this situation in a new interpretation is "nawābit". In the light of our analysis, we see that, with the exception of a name, nawābit is used as a concept with a negative content and connotation in both theology and philosophy. The exceptional person is the famous philosopher Ibn Bājja (Avempace) from Andalusia, the contemporary of Ibn Rushd (Averroes). While Mu‘tazili mutakallims use nawābit to humiliate groups such as Ahl-i hadith and Hashviyye, which adopt the narration-oriented line that puts reason and acumen to the second place, Al-Fārābī also uses the fault types and the sick characters in his virtuous city that he has constructed to describe. Ibn Bājja, on the other hand, considers the people called nawābit within his project to be equivalent to the "mutawahhid" (alone human) whose "precaution" he aims; this usage which corresponds with the context of the concept in the study. Because, in our study, nawābit is not considered as an identity, but as a representation of a character. (shrink)

Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Benefit Sharing is the first in-depth account of the Hoodia bioprospecting case and use of San traditional knowledge, placing it in the global context of indigenous peoples’ rights, consent and benefit-sharing. It is unique as the first interdisciplinary analysis of consent and benefit sharing in which philosophers apply their minds to questions of justice in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), lawyers interrogate the use of intellectual property rights to protect traditional knowledge, environmental scientists analyse implications (...) for national policies, anthropologists grapple with the commodification of knowledge and, uniquely, case experts from Asia, Australia and North America bring their collective expertise and experiences to bear on the San-Hoodia case. -/- While much of the focus is on bioprospecting and natural product development, Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Benefit-Sharing also draws important lessons about informed consent and benefit-sharing from the health sciences and sectors such as mining. Policymakers around the world are under significant pressure to resolve the challenges of implementing the CBD. This book’s analysis and recommendations will help them. -/- ‘It is good to see philosophers engaging with the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, and doing so by looking in depth at a real situation in which it has been invoked.’ Peter Singer, Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics in the University Center for Human Values, Princeton University . (shrink)

Peter Singer is probably the best-known and most controversial ethicist in the world today. He rigorously applies utilitarian moral theory to issues such as world poverty, the environment, abortion, euthanasia and, most famously, animal welfare. He has also written a book about his grandfather, David Oppenheim, who died in Theresienstadt concentration camp. He is Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University.

The July 1998 announcement of Peter Singer's appointment to the chair of bio ethics at Princeton University's Center for Human Values as the Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics raised a very loud controversy, largely due to Singer's favourable opinion of infanticide.The present paper is not the forum in which to recount this well publicized and often overly emotional conflict. Indeed, sustained critical discussion of the issues at hand was often found lacking in this debate. Generally the debate included on (...) the anti-Singer side people who had read little of his works, or who had perhaps merely heard his views second hand. The student newspaper of Princeton, the Daily Princetonian, documented many instances of this kind of opposition.On the other hand, his supporters tended to reply with accusations of quotations taken out of context and calls for academic freedom. This present paper is not interested in this debate, but rather concerns itself with the way in which Singer views the distinction between the human being and the person. It is this distinction which grounds his position on infanticide, and thus it is to this that we must turn.In this paper I take issue with Singer's use of the distinction between the person and the human. In so doing, I first explain Singer's basic position on personhood and sentience, and the relative value of organisms named under these two terms. With this discussion in hand, I then lay stress on a simple and repeated dictum of Singer's: the newborn infant up to the age of one month is not a person.This leads us to the position that the only possible ground for the selective infanticide of disabled infants is that newborn infants, healthy or not, are not persons, primarily because they lack self-consciousness. Then I investigate his ideas of personhood and self-consciousness as abstractions. Finally, in conclusion, I offer some observations drawn from Jonathan Swift. (shrink)

Buddhist meditation practices presuppose that the abstract doctrines of Buddhist teachings can be transformed into individual experiences. In contrast to the assumption of a merely solipsistic phenomenology which focuses on first-person perspectives alone, we would like to propose a sociological extension of this perspective to a relational perspective that includes specific world- and selfreferences. With the empirical case of a long-time practitioner of Theravada Buddhism, we show how the primary focus on individual experiences may be misleading in terms of Buddhist (...) training and how shifts in the first-person perspective only occur through social friction. In this way, we are able to present empirical insights into how individual qualities of meaning become linked to social qualities of meaning, which then can be understood as a process of co-production of individual and social meaning. The empirical basis of this contribution is part of the research project 'Buddhism in the West'. The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem. (Is not this the reason why those who have found after a long period of doubt that the meaning of life became clear to them have been unable to say what constituted that meaning?) -- Ludwig Wittgenstein (1974, Proposition 6.522) However it is, however it is he touches the arising-and-passing of aggregates: he gains rapture and joy: that, for those who know it, is deathless, the Deathless. --Dhammapada (373/374, Translation: Venerable Thanissaro). (shrink)

Spanning pivotal years in the historic democratization of South Africa, this analysis provides a trenchant reflection of higher education in transition. Penned by one of South Africa’s foremost philosophers of education, the critique grapples with very real concerns in higher education policymaking and practice, including stakeholder politics, institutional cultures, and curriculum transformation and interrogation of the function of higher education institutions in modern societies. Exposing the tensions between egalitarian principles and the nature of higher knowledge, the essays raise questions to (...) which there are no simple answers. With characteristic rigor, the analysis looks into the assumptions underlying much of the thinking about these questions and concludes that a failure to sharpen thinking around higher education is a failure to recognize the epistemic value of academic practice in a developing democracy. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Mitte der fünfziger Jahre entsteht mit den Arbeiten der amerikanischen Linguisten Zellig S. Harris und Noam Chomsky die Theorie der generativen (Transformations-)Grammatiken a) Chomskys Grammatikmodell in den "Aspects" ... b) Entwicklung der Theorie ... nach 1965 ...

Military and defense-related procurement has been an important source of technology development across a broad spectrum of industries that account for an important share of United States industrial production. In this book, the author focuses on six general-purpose technologies: interchangeable parts and mass production; military and commercial aircraft; nuclear energy and electric power; computers and semiconductors; the INTERNET; and the space industries. In each of these industries, technology development would have occurred more slowly, and in some case much more slowly (...) or not at all, in the absence of military and defense-related procurement. The book addresses three questions that have significant implications for the future growth of the United States economy. One is whether changes in the structure of the United States economy and of the defense-industrial base preclude military and defense-related procurement from playing the role in the development of advanced technology in the future, comparable to the role it has played in the past. A second question is whether public support for commercially oriented research and development will become an important source of new general-purpose technologies. A third and more disturbing question is whether a major war, or the threat of major war, will be necessary to mobilize the scientific, technical, and financial resources necessary to induce the development of new general-purpose technologies. When the history of United States technology development in the next half century is written, it will focus on incremental rather than revolutionary changes in both military and commercial technology. It will also be written within the context of slower productivity growth than of the relatively high rates that prevailed in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s or during the information technology bubble that began in the early 1990s. These will impose severe constraints on the capacity of the United States to sustain a global-class military posture and a position of leadership in the global economy. (shrink)